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 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
 VOLUME CI, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2004
 TESTABILITY AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE*
 S everal philosophers have accepted or presumed that the aim of
 making science unified is in conflict with the aim of keeping
 theories testable.' At issue is unity of domain as distinct from
 unity of method. Making science more unified in the sense intended
 gives rise to more comprehensive theories, and eventually to one
 theory so comprehensive that everything falls within the scope of the
 theory's claims, including any measurement apparatus used to test it.
 Since such a theory thus makes claims about the processes that pro-
 duce the evidence used to test it, some have thought that evidence
 so produced does not represent a test of the theory that is independent
 of the theory, and thereby that either the aim of unity or the commit-
 ment to testing theories independently of themselves must be given
 up. Ian Hacking affirmed this tension when he opted for the first
 horn of the dilemma: "it is precisely the disunity of science that allows
 us to observe (deploying one massive batch of theoretical assump-
 tions) another aspect of nature (about which we have an unconnected
 bunch of ideas)" in such a way that the observations are informative
 for testing.2 I will argue that the idea that there is a tension between
 * I would like to thank Eric Barnes and Samuel Mitchell for their commentaries
 on an American Philosophical Association version of this paper, and an anonymous
 referee for helpful criticism.
 1 See Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy
 of the Natural Sciences (New York: Cambridge, 1983), p. 183; Martin Carrier, "Circles
 without Circularity: Testing Theories by Theory-Laden Observations," in J.R. Brown
 and J. Mittelstrass, eds., An Intimate Relation: Studies in the History and Philosophy of
 Science (Boston: Kluwer, 1989), pp. 405-28, esp. pp. 409-10,423; Peter Kosso, "Science
 and Objectivity," this JOURNAL, LXXXVI, 5 (May 1989): 245-57, especially p. 246; and
 Robert G. Hudson, "Background Independence and the Causation of Observations,"
 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, xxv (1994): 595-612, especially p. 603. All
 of these authors accept Hacking's dilemma, discussed below, that there is a trade
 off between unity and testability, in some form that I will reject.
 2 Representing and Intervening, p. 183.
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 556 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
 these two aims is largely based on a conflation of factual and epistemic
 independence, and that although the de facto disunity of today's
 sciences does make it easy to avoid certain testability problems, dis-
 unity is not necessary to maintaining testability of theories. Thus, the
 aim to preserve the independent testability of theories is not a reason
 to give up the goal of unifying scientific theories.
 To give the view I oppose the greatest chance of being right I will
 understand the goal of unifying science in a strong sense: I will suppose
 that the aim is to find one (physical) theory that explains everything.
 I will not try to decide whether this means only that tokens must each
 find some correlate or other in the theory, or also that types in upper-
 level theories must be reduced to types in the theory. However, I will
 suppose that the fact that the theory sought explains everything
 means, in particular, that it gives an account of why certain (possibly
 upper-level) empirical processes are or are not reliable indicators for
 certain (possibly lower-level) states, for every such process and state.3
 The theory's explaining everything will mean, at least, that the theory
 is probabilistically relevant to every statement about the world-like
 the know-it-all, such a theory says something about everything.4 This
 latter assumption will be enough to generate the apparent problem.
 In particular, the theory will be probabilistically relevant to any
 statement as to whether a given process is a reliable indicator of a
 given state. To fix ideas, let us say that a process whose outcome will
 be either + or - is a reliable indicator of a given state, S, if and only
 if the process is such that P(S/+) is high and P(S/-) is low.5 The
 assumption I make, then, is that the truth or falsity of the know-it-all
 theory makes a difference to these probabilities. If so, then because
 the know-it-all theory predicts either S or not-S when + or - is the
 outcome respectively (since it predicts something about everything),
 SI am using the terms 'upper-level' and 'lower-level' as in discussions of reduc-
 tionism, where reduced theories are upper-level and their entities are often composed
 of the entities of the lower-level reducing theory. Physics is lower level, psychology
 upper level.
 4As Wesley Salmon argued in Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the
 World (Princeton: University Press, 1984), pp. 84-89, 46, there are cases of explanation
 in which the explanans lowers the probability of the explanandum, and it is even
 typical for part of the explanans to do so. This is not a problem for our assumption
 since negative probabilistic relevance is a kind of probabilistic relevance. It is anyway
 clear that negative probabilistic relevance of a theory to test procedures has as much
 potential as positive relevance does to allow the theory to affect the assessment of a
 test of it, since through negative relevance to the reliability of a test procedure the
 theory may veto the credibility of an outcome that stands ready to falsify it.
 SThe expression 'P(S/+)' should be read "the probability of S given +," and
 P(S/ -) should be read "the probability of S given -."
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 TESTABILITY 557
 it is clear that this theory can affect our assessment of whether the
 fact that, say, + occurred supports, undermines, or does not affect
 our right to believe this same theory. It would do so by having a view,
 so to speak, about whether the occurrence of + does or does not
 indicate that S obtains. Thus, for us to take a view about whether S
 obtains is to agree or disagree with the theory under test in deciding
 whether the evidence counts for or against that theory.
 I will suppose in addition that the theory sought is internally unified,
 that is, that the accounts it gives of empirical processes that might be
 used to test it could not easily be separated from the accounts it gives
 of other things, perhaps because it has an ontology with only one or
 a few types of entity, or it has a single set of laws. At a minimum, the
 theory is not tacked together. This is a property of theories that
 has actually been sought by physicists. For example, Albert Einstein
 demanded of physical theories that they give an account of all measur-
 ing devices whose results are relevant to their testing in a way that
 does not make those devices a distinct class of entity from the other
 entities that the theory posits, and faulted special relativity for not
 achieving this aim.6
 Internal unity of the sought-for theory makes the task of this paper
 more difficult because it is a property that will tend to block an easy
 way of getting out of problems that unity might present for testability:
 it will prevent us from testing the theory by testing its pieces one at
 a time. Taking this property on board makes the problem about
 testability look especially acute in light of typical discussions of inde-
 pendence of evidence.from the theory under test. A natural way to
 analyze how far a theory's being used to give an account of observa-
 tional evidence is independent of the theory under test, when the two
 are the same theory, is to divide that theory into participant and benefi-
 ciary parts and look at how far the truth conditions of those two parts
 are independent, as Peter Kosso does.' The internal unity that I have
 just attributed to the maximally unified theory suggests that parts of the
 theory under test will be very difficult to separate in this way. If so, then
 on Kosso's account it would follow immediately that testability of that
 theory independently of itself is close to impossible.
 One might protest against the ethereal quality of posing the ques-
 tion about unity in the way I have, about a maximally unified theory,
 since we do not seem very close to finding such a thing. However,
 6 "Autobiographical Notes," in P.A. Schilpp, ed., Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist
 (La Salle: Open Court, 1949), pp. 2-95, here p. 59.
 7 "Science and Objectivity," pp. 252, 257.
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 558 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
 physicists do seek a grand unified theory that would account for every
 scale of the universe, and a significant number of people do believe,
 rightly or wrongly, that such a theory would provide an explanation
 of everything, at every level. One might think that the kind of thing
 physicists seek would not qualify as maximally unified because there
 would always be separate boundary conditions, but some physicists
 even take it as an ideal goal for physical theory that all brute numbers
 eventually be predicted from laws, however unattainable that might
 seem. If the most unified theory we ever found did not make predic-
 tions unless it was combined with quite independent boundary condi-
 tions, the question I am asking here could still easily arise for the
 theory because that highly unified theory would likely be probabilis-
 tically relevant to auxiliaries assumed about measuring devices used to
 test it. Asking the question in the manner I do in this paper is simpler
 than carrying along a discussion of boundary conditions, and because the
 results defend unity, they defend those slightly less unified cases as well.
 If the disunitarians were right, then that would be significant. It
 would mean that scientists should give up on finding a certain kind
 of theory, because even if they succeeded in finding the type of thing
 they are looking for, it would not be possible to test that theory
 empirically. An untestable theory might be good speculative metaphys-
 ics, but it would not be good physics. Moreover, the positive relevance
 view of what evidence is, which is popular among philosophers of
 science, where e is evidence for Hjust in case e is positively probabi-
 listically relevant to H, that is, just in case P(H/e) > P(H), appears to
 add further plausibility to the disunitarian claim by treatingjudgments
 about reliability of the evidence and confirmation of the theory in
 commensurable formats. If what it takes to be evidence for something
 is raising the probability of that thing, and the most unified theory
 is probabilistically relevant to everything, then it appears that that
 theory can raise (or lower) the probability of claims that will then
 raise (or lower) its probability, namely the claims about whether the
 test process was reliable. Circular justification appears to threaten.
 In the popular Bayesian conception of scientific reasoning, hypoth-
 eses, and all other statements, are assigned probabilities, and on many
 versions of the Bayesian view probabilities translate fairly directly into
 degrees of belief, smoothing further the path to an apparent problem.
 In particular, a prior probability must be assigned to the unified
 theory; it is not an option to imagine oneself as withholdingj udgment
 on the theory until the evidence is assessed, because without a prior
 probability the theory can have no posterior probability. The force
 of that prior probability propagates over all of the statements the
 theory is relevant to-if the theory is probabilistically relevant to a
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 matter, then the prior probability of the theory will affect the probabil-
 ity that matter gets. In the case we are imagining, the prior probability
 of the theory will apparently have an effect on the probabilities of
 the auxiliaries used to decide whether a given test outcome should
 be counted for or against that very theory.
 Thus the question I am addressing here is more timely and pressing
 than it may at first appear. The arguments in this paper aim for a
 strong conclusion insofar as they respond to the disunitarian idea
 without denying the positive relevance conception of evidence, the
 Bayesian conception just described, or the requirement of indepen-
 dent evidence for auxiliaries.8 Indeed, I will show that, contrary to
 appearances, lack of probabilistic relevance between theory and relia-
 bility-auxiliary is well suited to measuring epistemic independence of
 an account of evidence from the theory under test.
 Even so, one may say, this epistemological argument against the
 unity of science was never as influential as other arguments for the
 same conclusion. Since, one may think, the disunitarians have won
 those other arguments, turning back this argument would not get us
 very far. However, this would be a mistaken impression of the situation;
 in fact, this epistemological argument is stronger than typical argu-
 ments against reductionism, because it applies even to reductionism's
 weaker cousin. One of the strongest arguments against the domain
 unity of science wasJerry Fodor's argument that the plausible doctrine
 of token physicalism-every event is a physical event-is distinct from
 and significantly weaker than the less plausible unitarian thesis of
 reductionism, which implies that every kind corresponds to a physical
 kind.' Unitarians can do all they need to do with the former, he
 argued, and must not claim the latter on the basis of the plausibility
 of the former. Like Fodor, one might think that, despite all of the
 81I assume that what is wrong with judgments of the evidence lacking independence
 from the theory under test is circularity in reasoning, by which I mean use of a
 theory as a reason to believe or discount evidence for or against that theory, and
 that such circularity is a bad thing. For a defense of this, see my "Testability and
 Candor," forthcoming in Synthese. Clark Glymour's bootstrapping account of confir-
 mation in Theory and Evidence (Princeton: University Press, 1980) is well suited to
 understanding the relativity of evidence to the theory under test, but is not concerned
 enough about independence of evidence for auxiliaries-see Theory and Evidence,
 pp. 114-21. His condition that "to test a hypothesis we must do something that could
 result in presumptive evidence against the hypothesis" is necessary but insufficient
 for independence of evidence from the theory under test, for reasons developed in
 "Testability and Candor." Thus, I am here classifying Glymour's view as giving up
 on the requirement of independence of evidence from the theory under test.
 9 "Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis," Synthese,
 xxviii (1974): 97-115.
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 arguments against the domain unity of science, a retreat to token physi-
 calism is still a safe bet. The epistemological argument under discussion
 threatens to destroy even this safe retreat, since a physical theory that
 made good on the token physicalist claim would say something about
 every event, and thus would be probabilistically relevant to every event,
 including all of those involved in the setups used to test it.
 We must ask if such a theory could be tested, and if the answer is
 "no" then even token physicalism cannot be recommended as a guide
 to the development of scientific theory. In that case it could still be
 that token physicalism is true, but no theory that exemplified it could
 be considered genuinely testable, and hence really scientific. Disuni-
 tarians and unitarians alike seem to regard token physicalism as innoc-
 uous. Ironically, if the epistemic disunitarian argument is right then
 this doctrine may be true but pernicious as a recommendation for
 what kind of physical theory to look for. It would be wrong even to
 look for a comprehensive, unified theory within physics construed as
 a special science.
 My procedure here will be to imagine that we have a maximally
 unified theory-call it "Behemoth"-and investigate what it would be
 like to test it. I will consider what is required for independence of
 evidence and argue that Behemoth's scope does not pose an un-
 answerable challenge to finding it. If unity is a problem for testability,
 then Behemoth will be the hardest possible case, so dealing with it
 will be sufficient to defend unity. The potential source of problems
 is not hard to see. In the course of evaluating evidence from a test
 as to whether it tells for or against a theory, or reveals nothing at all,
 one must evaluate the reliability of the test processes as indicators of
 theoretical quantities. If they are deemed unreliable then we have
 reason to discount the outcomes of the test, whether they were unfa-
 vorable or favorable to the theory. Such discounting will favor or
 fail to favor the theory respectively. We would not want to believe
 mistakenly that they were unreliable, lest we throw out valuable con-
 firming or disconfirming evidence about the theory. But if they are
 unreliable, then it is important that we believe they are because other-
 wise we might count results as favoring or disfavoring a theory when
 they really reveal nothing at all. In other words, it is important for
 testing the theory that our judgments of the reliability of the process
 producing the evidence are correct; they also should not be prejudiced
 by that theory.
 As I have said, unifying science would make one theory that had
 something to say about the reliability of every process that could be
 used to test it. That is, considering the matters in isolation, the theory
 would be probabilistically relevant to whether S is the case given +
This content downloaded from 
            131.179.158.12 on Sat, 27 Jun 2020 08:30:54 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TESTABILITY 561
 and whether S is the case given - for every state S, and every set of
 possible outcomes of a measuring process, '+' and '-'.'o For every
 S, that S obtains will be confirming or disconfirming of the theory
 (to some extent)-because the theory will have predicted either S or
 not-S--and the theory will apparently have the power to affect whether
 we have a right to believe that S obtains. Circularity-the theory's
 passing judgment on itself-appears to threaten.
 THE NORMAL CASE
 To judge whether these suggestions hold up, we need to consider the
 matter step by step, starting with the normal case. In many actual
 cases in our current un-unified science, what the reliability judgments
 in question are about has nothing to do with the subject matter of
 the theory under scrutiny. In studying cells under a microscope, for
 example, the reliability of our evidence will depend to a large extent
 on the workings of that instrument. But the optical processes transpir-
 ing in a microscope do not fall within the scope of any hypothesis
 about cells. No knowledge of cells is required to know something
 about the workings of a microscope. Nor would knowledge of cells,
 if we had it, help us to know about the microscope. This is in the
 first place because cells and lenses are factually, and therefore probabi-
 listically, irrelevant to each other; cell claims (C) being true would
 make no difference to whether lens claims (L) were true. (Therefore,
 P(L/ C) = P(L) whether probability is construed objectively or subjec-
 tively.") The intuition that says evidence, to be evidence, should be
 probabilistically relevant to the hypothesis it is evidence for, is embod-
 ied in the Bayesian predilection for counting e as evidence for H only
 when P(H/e) > P(H), which holds just in case P(e/H) > P(e).'2
 The hypothesis about cells that is under test by a microscope could
 not possibly be evidence for or against statements of the reliability of
 the microscope. No (rational) use could be made of any statement that
 'o Obviously, in general a measuring process may have any number of possible
 outcomes. I persist in using '+' and '-' for the possible outcomes to represent the
 division between those that are favorable and those that are unfavorable to the theory
 under test. For simplicity here, I am assuming that outcomes can bejudged favorable
 or unfavorable independently of assumptions about the truth of the theory under test.
 " This should be read: "The probability of L given C is equal to the probability
 of L."
 12 Note that probabilistic relevance is a weaker condition, easier to fulfill, than
 logical relevance, and probabilistic independence is therefore a stronger condition
 than logical independence. Two statements are logically independent if the truth
 value of neither fixes the truth value of the other, but probabilistically independent
 only if the truth value of one makes no difference whatever to the probability of
 the other.
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 is a deductive consequence of the hypothesis in the assessment of the
 reliability of the microscope, because that hypothesis has nothing to
 offer.'3 This example illustrates why probabilistic relevance is necessary
 between two things if one is to be evidence for the other. Those
 worried about the consequences of unity for testability are right to
 think that probabilistic irrelevance (independence) between theory
 under test and the account of the measuring apparatus is a salutary
 feature of ordinary (so far un-unified) science. Our beliefs or preju-
 dices about the cell hypothesis we are testing have no rational route
 through which to contaminate our beliefs about the reliability of the
 instrument used to test it, the microscope.
 PROBABILISTIC REVELANCE AND EVIDENCE
 If there were probabilistic relevance between hypothesis under test
 and process happening in the measuring instrument, considered in
 isolation, then this easy insurance that our knowledge of the latter
 was independent of our beliefs and prejudices about the former would
 be gone. It is tempting to suppose that this automatically means
 trouble in the form of circularity in our testing. After all, in this case
 whether or not the theory is true makes a difference to the probability
 that the process used in testing (that theory) was reliable.
 It does follow that there is a problem on Kosso's account of indepen-
 dence of evidence from the theory under test, mentioned earlier. This
 is because his recipe for determining whether evidence is independent
 from the theory under test is to ask which theoretical statements we
 accept in the account of the measuring apparatus, and then to ask
 whether those statements are independent in their truth conditions
 from the statements of the theory under test. If there is an identity
 between any statements in the two sets, as there will be if there is
 probabilistic relevance between theory under test and theory of the
 instrument (whether considered in isolation or all things considered),
 then on this view we automatically get lack of epistemic independence
 between the two.'4
 The unitarian must hope that there is a glitch both in the intuitive
 idea, and in Kosso's analysis. But as for the intuitive idea, if we take,
 13 In other words, if we let our prejudices about cells affect the probabilities we
 assigned to claims about the microscope, we would be irrational. The axioms of
 probability do a great service here in disqualifying as irrational all manner of influence
 by irrelevant factors. Of course, the axioms have no remedy against a subject who
 assigns probabilities in such a way as to make one thing relevant to another when
 it is not in fact relevant. To disqualify that requires further constraints on the probabil-
 ity function.
 14 "Science and Objectivity," pp. 252, 257.
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 as the Bayesians do, positive probabilistic relevance as the defining
 property of evidence, then if there is positive probabilistic relevance
 of the theory under test to the account of the instrument, then the
 theory under test is evidence for a certain account of the instrument,
 which account will be crucial in determining whether the results of
 the experiment favor or undermine the theory. To defend unity, then,
 we have to ask whether there is any good reason to deny the positive
 relevance view of evidence, or to think we are mistaken about its impli-
 cations.
 The obvious place to put pressure is on the assumption that positive
 probabilistic relevance of A to B is sufficient for A to be evidence for
 B. And there is intuitive reason for doing so. It is plausible, intuitively,
 that a further condition for A to be evidence for B, beyond A's rele-
 vance to B, is that A is one of our reasons for believing B, part of the
 basis for our belief in B. This suggests that it is wrong to think that
 relevance of A to B is generally sufficient for A's being evidence for
 B, because we can imagine having a belief that is relevant to another
 belief but which is not the basis on which we hold that other belief;
 we may have other sufficient reasons for the second belief. There are
 cases where the relevance of A to B is sufficient for A to be evidence
 for B if anything is, but these are cases where A is the only belief we
 have that is relevant to B.
 That a belief may not be the basis for another of our beliefs even
 if the first is relevant to the second-in the sense that whether the
 first is true makes a difference to whether the second is true-is the
 intuitive key to the primary way in which theories or hypotheses
 probabilistically relevant to the reliability of the processes used to
 produce evidence for or against them can fail to result in circular
 testing. This is also the area in which Kosso's analysis of independence
 of evidence fails: though Kosso was rightly aiming at an epistemic
 notion of independence, the particular mechanics of his analysis missed
 the mark. Because on his view we first ask which statements about
 the instrument are accepted and then ask whether those statements
 are independent in their truth conditions from the theory under test,
 we lose any purchase on whether the reasons for which we accepted
 the statements that make up the account of the instrument are inde-
 pendent of belief in the theory under test.
 Kosso's analysis of independence of evidence from the theory under
 test does not allow for the possibility that we believe and use a claim
 that is a part of the theory under test without that theory being our
 basis for believing the claim. Yet, surely this is possible, and it is the
 place to look for how to turn back the disunitarian argument, as we
 will do in following sections. It is a separate question whether the
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 notion of probabilistic relevance respects this intuitive idea that one
 may have a belief that is factually relevant to another, yet not one's
 basis for belief in the other, but we will see that it does if we have a
 proper understanding of probabilistic relevance.
 THE ABNORMAL CASE
 Consider a simple case in which a hypothesis is relevant to reliability
 auxiliaries used to test it.'5 Our hypothesis, H, is that all fluids expand
 on heating. We will test it by heating many fluids and measuring their
 volumes as we take their temperatures with a mercury thermometer.
 One auxiliary hypothesis, call it "X", that we want to assume about the
 reliability of the instrument is obvious: mercury expands on increase of
 its temperature. But assuming as we can from background knowledge
 that mercury is a fluid, the hypothesis under test, H, is probabilistically
 relevant to this auxiliary X) in fact, the latter is an instance of the former.
 Despite this probabilistic relevance between hypothesis under test
 and auxiliary, we can have evidence for this auxiliary independently
 of the hypothesis. Notice that there are other methods of measuring
 temperature than glass bulb thermometers, and we can use one of
 those methods, say electrical resistance, to calibrate our glass bulb
 thermometer.16 That is, our other method of measuring temperature
 will tell us that the mercury's expansion does indicate a rise in temper-
 ature. Let e be the claim that the electrical resistance method says
 that our glass bulb thermometer accurately indicates elevation of
 temperature (in a given range).
 Let us assume,just for the moment, that we know that the electrical
 resistance method is reliable. Then we could use e as evidence for X,
 the auxiliary, because e is relevant to X. That is,
 (1) P(X/e) > P(X)
 But under our assumption that the electrical resistance method is
 reliable, e is also (positively) probabilistically relevant to H. Another
 way of saying this is that e is not probabilistically independent of
 5 Allen Franklin et al. cite this example as falsifying the thesis that theory-laden
 observations cannot test theories in "Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the
 Theory?" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, XL (1989): 229-31. However, no
 analysis is given there of why this is possible, in this case or in general.
 " We could also heat a closed container of mercury on a Bunsen burner and
 confirm that the upper surface of the mercury rises by watching. The point is that
 other processes exist for calibrating the mercury thermometer. I have chosen a
 sophisticated method to avoid the suggestion that what matters is watching things
 we have more direct access to than we do to the workings of the measuring instrument
 we began with.
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 H, that is, the evidence for the auxiliary X is not probabilistically
 independent of the hypothesis under test. However, notice that de-
 spite this, and despite the fact that H is probabilistically relevant to
 X, the relevance between e and X is unaffected by H in the follow-
 ing sense:
 (2) P(e/X.H) = P(e/X)
 Since of the many instances of fluid and temperature H speaks of, e
 commented only on those pertaining to our glass bulb thermometer,
 no part of H except X-H's restriction to mercury-is relevant to e.
 X thus screens off the relevance of H to e.
 The phenomenon of screening off is key to understanding why
 probabilistic relevance can respect our intuitive notion of indepen-
 dent evidence and the fact that it is not identical to lack of intuitive
 relevance or to what I have called "factual" independence. C screens
 off A from B if and only if P(B/C) = P(B/C.A). In such situations,
 though A may be probabilistically relevant to B when the two are
 considered in isolation, and though C does not change that fact, when
 C screens off A from B, assuming C true renders that relation between
 B and A, as it were, impotent." Moreover, if C screens off A from B,
 then according to a probability function that assigns probability 1 to
 C (effectively taking Cto be true), the relevance between Band A is not
 merely impotent but nonexistent, since B and A are not probabilistically
 relevant. In our example, e and H are no less intuitively relevant to
 each other, and are no more factually independent of each other, if
 we suppose that X is true, but if X is taken into account then e and
 H are probabilistically independent.
 That condition (2) is fulfilled is not enough, though, for the kind
 of independence we need in order to avoid circularity of testing, for
 two reasons. Although, as in (1), e raises the probability of X when
 the two are considered in isolation, it also appears that H screens off
 the relevance of e to X, that is, that e is not evidence for X if H is
 assumed. Second, we want not only that e can affect the probability
 of X, but also that our grounds for believing e itself are "independent"
 of our beliefs about H. By this I mean that our grounds for believing
 e are secure or securable whatever our beliefs about the truth or falsity
 of H. It is only this kind of independence that will prevent a circularity
 in which our belief in His part of our grounds for believing e, which is
 17 Because if C screens off A from B then it follows that C screens off B from A,
 when C screens off A from Bwe can say "C screens off the relevance between A and B."
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 part of our grounds for deciding what to believe about H. Fortunately,
 addressing the second concern will also address the first.
 Our grounds for believing e as I have stated it-"the electrical
 resistance method says that our glass bulb thermometer accurately
 indicates elevation of temperature (in a given range) "-can be inde-
 pendent of our beliefs about H, because we can verify what the electri-
 cal resistance method says about the temperature of the thermometer
 without recourse to assumptions about heating fluids. However, this
 is too easy because in that statement of e I left the reliability of electri-
 cal resistance as a method of measuring temperature out of consider-
 ation, assuming it as background. e will not help us to verify X of course,
 unless we have some assurance that this other method is reliable. So,
 the main kind of independence we want amounts to this in the present
 case: we want our grounds for believing E, that electrical resistance
 is a reliable method of measuring temperature, to be securable regard-
 less of what we believe about the truth or falsity of H.
 It seems right that we can know whether the electrical resistance
 method is reliable regardless of what we believe about H. This is
 because the electrical resistance method makes no essential use of
 fluids or volumes. If so, then it is because His not factually or intuitively
 relevant to E, which is sufficient to imply that His not probabilistically
 relevant to E when H and E are considered in isolation. That is,
 (3) P(E/H) = P(E)
 If we are able to assign a high probability to E, it will not be because
 of the probability we assigned to H. Because H does not meet the
 first necessary condition mentioned above for being evidence for
 E--probabilistic relevance-H cannot be evidence for E, and so does
 not thereby act as evidence for e which is evidence for the auxiliary
 X that we need in order to test H.
 This shows that His not evidence for e, but not yet that H does not
 act as evidence for the auxiliary X. For this we need to evaluate whether
 e and E screen off H from X, that is, whether P(X/e.E.H) is equal to
 P(X/e.E). In fact, these terms will never be exactly equal, but the
 reason need not concern us; it is because of the extreme relevance
 of H to X-given that mercury is a fluid, H implies X-and no finite
 amount of inductive evidence can replace deductive warrant. How-
 ever, e and E do act in the direction of screening off H from X that is,
 E reduces the probabilistic relevance of H to X (when e is confirmed).
 We might say that statements like e and E screen off H from X by
 degrees, and to the extent that they do so H is not probabilistically
 relevant to X and thus not evidence for X.
 We avoid an evidential circle if we use the electrical resistance method
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 to validate the mercury thermometer, because we avoid a probabilistic
 relevance circle. This shows how despite probabilistic relevance of H
 to X, that is, of a hypothesis to an auxiliary about the reliability of
 the processes used to test it, when the two are considered in isolation,
 we need not have a testing circularity in which His a reason to believe
 evidence for itself: we can have reasons to believe X that we have
 grounds for regardless of our beliefs about H. The probability calculus
 conforms to this idea, since the statements about the results and
 reliability of the electrical resistance method will screen off (at least
 by degrees) the relevance of H to e and the relevance of H to X.
 This lack of connection, however, between H's being probabilis-
 tically relevant to X, when the two are considered in isolation, and
 H's being evidence for X is achieved through the existence of a
 process for verifying X that H is not probabilistically relevant to even
 when the two are considered in isolation. This reaffirms that the
 easiest way to ensure that one thing is not used as evidence for another
 is for the first to fail to be factually relevant to the second, or, as here,
 relevant to our evidence for the second. Much as we have learned
 here about the difference between factual or intuitive relevance and
 probabilistic relevance, this kind of case cannot help us decide what
 to think about unity and testability. This is because there is a salient
 difference between H and Behemoth, the maximally unified theory:
 for any process used to test Behemoth-all of which Behemoth will
 be relevant to-there will be no other process with which to calibrate
 its reliability that Behemoth is not also relevant to, since there is no
 process at all that Behemoth is not relevant to. We are back again to
 the bare question whether the probabilistic relevance of a theory to
 a reliability auxiliary makes the theory evidence for the auxiliary, and
 how there could be evidence for the auxiliary that is independent of
 a theory with such reach.
 THE FOUNDATIONALISM OF BASIC BELIEFS ACCESSED DIRECTLY
 Where should we look for a basis for beliefs about measurement processes
 that is independent of the theory under test? We might think we could get
 leverage from the following thought: generalizations are intuitively,
 factually, and probabilistically relevant to their instances, yet surely
 their instances serve as evidence for them, and as evidence that is inde-
 pendent of them. That is, in the most basic case of empirical inquiry,
 our grounds for believing instances are what they are regardless of
 our beliefs about the generalizations they confirm. We can find out
 whether a particular swan is white on grounds that we have access to
 regardless of our beliefs (or prejudices) about whether all swans are
 white, can we not? We may think so in simple cases. We know what
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 counts as a swan, and what counts as white by inspection and defini-
 tions. And we know that our perceptual systems are reliable, when
 we do, without appeal to the generalization that all swans are white.
 Any prejudice we might have about the truth value of the claim that
 all swans are white does not need to play a role in determining whether
 a given case is a confirming or disconfirming instance.
 To suppose, however, that this is a model for how we should think
 of our question about testing maximally unified theories would involve
 stronger foundationalist assumptions than many might be comfort-
 able with. After all, in the swan case the hypothesis under test does
 not say anything about what counts as white or what counts as a swan;
 it is probabilistically irrelevant to these questions. It is otherwise with
 Behemoth, the theory that says something about everything. By anal-
 ogy, it would say something about the equivalent of what counts as a
 swan and what counts as white, because its statements say something
 relevant to whether a given outcome counts as reliable. To suppose
 in general, without further ado, that a theory that is relevant in this
 way to the means of verifying instances has no role as a ground for the
 instances seems to require supposing that there is a class of things that
 are known by some basic means, like inspection, and for the grounds
 of belief in which no abstract theory or consideration is required.
 It is interesting, though not too surprising, that one of the resources
 of foundationalism would seem to be to block the association of
 greater unification with failure of independent testability, but we have
 to wonder whether something similar could be achieved without the
 foundationalist assumption I cited. Foundationalism's lack of popular-
 ity is not the only reason to wonder: consider that Behemoth, which
 is probabilistically relevant to every process, ought also to be relevant
 to whatever process gives us the right to our basic beliefs. Merely citing
 the existence of an immediate evidence-giving process like inspection,
 though it may show why use of Behemoth as evidence for claims
 designated basic is not necessary, does not articulate why Behemoth
 could not or should not be competing evidence for or against those
 claims. While the foundationalism I have sketched seems to me too
 much to swallow with its privileging of beliefs formed by inspection,
 the more pressing problem is that it is not strong enough to answer
 our question.
 THE SOLUTION
 It is a commonplace of "new" philosophy of science that in the history
 and practice of science theories are not tested alone, as if against
 their negations, but are always compared to a particular rival. This
 idea can help us here. That a theory wins against a particular rival in
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 a test is obviously insufficient to show that the theory is true, but let
 us set aside for the moment worries that being tested against rivals is
 too low an epistemic standard. It seems far fetched to suppose that
 we will come up with two or more Behemoth-sized candidate theories
 when it is so difficult to come up with even one (unified) theory that
 could purport to explain everything, but we will be rewarded if we
 indulge the fantasy for the sake of argument.
 So, suppose we have two Behemoth-sized theories, each of which
 offers some explanation for everything, and is probabilistically relevant
 to everything. If our task in a test is to choose between these rivals, then,
 I claim, it is possible, even likely, that we can have evidence for the
 reliability of the test processes, and therefore for tilting in the direc-
 tion of one or the other theory, independently of the theories. This
 is so despite the probabilistic relevance of both of them to every test
 process. The reason, schematically, is that it is possible, even likely,
 for the two rivals to agree on whether a given test process was reliable,
 while disagreeing in their predictions about the outcomes in the test.
 In such a case, the reason that the evidence we get from the test
 would be independent of our beliefs about which theory is better
 would be not that the theories are irrelevant to the test process, or
 that certain things are known by inspection and not in any other way,
 but that whichever theory you favor will give you the same view of
 the reliability of the test process. Your favoritism toward one or the
 other theory will make no difference to your view of the test process.
 For example, it is certainly possible, for reasons of logic, for two
 theories to have different views about whether all fluids expand on
 heating-the matter at issue in our earlier test-while having the
 same view of whether mercury expands on heating under normal
 conditions in the medium range. If two such theories were the rivals
 you were considering, and the view of both was that mercury does
 expand on heating in the usual circumstances, then you could assume
 this regardless of your stand on the issue the two theories disagree
 about. That two rival theories have a view about every process does
 not imply that they have different views of every process at every
 level of description. In fact, given the types of theories they will be,
 Behemoth-sized theories are likely to agree about quite a lot. This is
 because it is a condition of adequacy for such a theory that it does
 well at predicting the things we take ourselves to know already--it
 should, ideally, make predictions that are the same as or better than
 those of all of our best less general theories in every domain, at
 every level where those other theories have been tested. Where two
 Behemoth theories will differ is in the deeper accounts they give of
 all such things-Is it strings beneath it all?, for example.
This content downloaded from 
            131.179.158.12 on Sat, 27 Jun 2020 08:30:54 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 570 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
 For present purposes we do not need to take a stand on what it is
 about the structure of knowledge that makes some claims more justi-
 fied than others, and therefore more likely to be agreed on by rival
 theories of everything. And we do not need to say here what our
 grounds are for believing these agreed-upon claims, though in my
 view it has to do with the claims having survived scientific scrutiny for
 long periods of time rather than with the claims being matters we have
 direct access to. It is enough for present purposes to notice that there
 will be quite a few such claims, and they will not all be direct observations,
 an advantage of this strategy over the earlier foundationalist reply.
 For example, the predictions and even some of the regularities among
 theoretical quantities of Newton's laws of motion and of classical electro-
 magnetism, in their restricted ranges of applicability, will be among the
 things we are more justified in believing than we are either Behemoth
 candidate. It is important that the agreed-upon claims not all be merely
 observational because in many cases knowing the reliability of a. test
 procedure requires knowing that the procedure is a trustworthy indi-
 cator of some theoretical quantity. Observations alone cannot provide
 links between observations and unobserved quantities, and those links
 are essential to testing theoretical claims. There is the additional fact,
 in favor of my overall point, that we tend to use as probes processes
 we understand better than the processes we are investigating; this
 makes it likely again that the processes used as probes will be matters
 the Behemoth-sized rivals agree about.
 Moreover, we can throw away the ladder in this argument: since
 what is doing all the work is the claim that some of our claims are
 morejustified than others, we do not need to suppose that a Behemoth
 has an articulated Behemoth-sized rival to suppose that it can be
 tested. If I am right that some of our claims are more justified than
 others, and that the things that need to be assumed in testing are
 often among the claims that are betterjustified, then those who favor
 the Behemoth theory and those who oppose it without a rival theory
 to offer will tend to agree on quite a lot about what happens when
 it gets tested, and the basis for that agreement will be already accumu-
 lated justified belief. "New" philosophy of science was not necessary,
 after all. Of course, nothing here says that our justified, or somewhat
 justified, beliefs about what goes on in processes we think we already
 understand are true. However, the question at issue here was not
 their truth but rather on what basis they were believed. The saving
 bit is that they were believed on the basis of other things than commit-
 ment to the theory under test.
 Essentially, this argument that unity need not interfere with the
 testing of a Behemoth corresponds to the following fact about probabi-
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 listic relevance: even if for any X, the theory T is probabilistically
 relevant to X when T and X are considered in isolation, if there exists
 a C such that C screens off T from X, that is, P(X/ C. T) = P(X/ C),
 then if C is in the background knowledge the probability assigned to
 Twill not affect the probability assigned to X. The Behemoth theory
 may be probabilistically relevant to everything when this theory is
 considered in isolation from background beliefs, but it will not "govern"
 its own testing to the extent that background assumptions--secured
 antecedently and effectively given probability 1 by the probability
 function--screen off the relevance of Behemoth to particular processes
 we already understand well.
 This is because the screening off of Behemoth by background
 knowledge means that in the testing situation Behemoth is not proba-
 bilistically relevant to the test procedures. This corresponds to the
 intuitive idea of a belief failing to be the basis of another belief despite its
 being "relevant" to that second belief. That a theory is probabilistically
 relevant to X when the two are considered in isolation does not im-
 ply that the theory is probabilistically relevant to X in the testing situa-
 tion, and so does not imply dire consequences about the circularity
 of the testing. In many situations in science screening off is achieved
 through use of a process that is factually independent of the theory
 under test, as in the validation of the mercury thermometer above.
 But screening off can also occur simply because what screens off the
 hypothesis under test is part of the background knowledge. How did
 it get to be part of the background knowledge? The concession may
 be unavoidable that the testing of a Behemoth must be preceded
 by a great deal of un-unified empirical science in order that this
 background knowledge be secured with an appropriate independence
 from the Behemoth. However, this is not much of a concession, since
 we were not asking whether Thales's theory that all is water was
 empirically testable when he announced it, but whether we who have
 inherited a mountain of results of un-unified empirical science can
 afford to have more unified theories in the future.
 Of course, none of this means that there will never be processes
 used in tests whose reliability as indicators of theoretical quantities
 the two theories under test, or the proponents and opponents of one
 theory, disagree about, but such theories will be testable if there will
 be, as it seems there often will, plenty of tests that do not have this
 property. To the credit of the disunitarian's argument, I do not see
 how any general guarantees can be made that testability can always
 be preserved in the face of increasing unity, and their intuition identi-
 fies the reason why. However, the challenge they have identified does
 not show that we must fail.
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 This is true even in cases where background knowledge is insuffi-
 cient to screen off the relevance of theories to processes used to test
 them. It has in fact happened that one of the only crucial tests we
 knew how to make between two very general theories involved a
 process that the rival theories disagreed about and about which
 agreed-upon assumptions could not decide, but through ingenuity
 and luck epistemic folly was avoided. I refer to the fact that in the
 Michelson-Morley experiment one must measure the lengths of the
 arms of the apparatus in order to know whether the seeing or not of
 interference fringes means anything. The experimenters used a ruler
 for this purpose, but even more sophisticated means of measuring
 would run into the following stumbling block: the rival to the ether
 theory implied that due. to Lorentz contraction that ruler (or other
 measuring device) would have different lengths in the two directions!'8
 Epistemic folly was avoided here because in fact the amount of
 error that could be introduced by the Lorentz contraction of the
 rulers could contribute only at the third or fourth order, as both H.A.
 Lorentz and L. Silberstein argued, whereas Michelson and Morley
 were probing second order effects. In other words, though both theo-
 ries, taken in isolation, were probabilistically relevant to the disputed
 assumption (in opposite directions), and this relevance could not be
 screened off by background knowledge, neither was probabilistically
 relevant to the crucial measurement, because of the way the apparatus
 worked and a consequent mismatch between the order of the effects
 probed and the order of the effects of the disputed assumption.
 The idea of background assumptions we have an antecedent right
 to, and their damping effect on probabilistic relevance, provides a
 general recipe for seeing how we secure independent testability in
 most cases where it looks like there is too much relevance for comfort:
 the background assumptions screen off the probabilistic relevance of
 the theory under test. For the cases where background knowledge
 does not provide enough to screen off relevance, what we can say in
 general is less informative, yet not trivial. The case I havejust described
 is exceptional in science for the combination of high ontological
 overlap between the domain of the tested theory and claims about
 how the measuring apparatus worked, with high generality of the
 theory under test: anything that could act as a ruler would have had
 the same problem. But the fact that such cases are exceptional in
 is Ronald Laymon, "The Michelson-Morley Experiment and the Appraisal of Theo-
 ries," in Arthur Donovan et al., eds., Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific
 Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1992), pp. 245-66.
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 actual science does not get us off the hook: these are precisely the
 kinds of situations that increasing unity makes more likely.
 Though this case shows that there are situations where the screening
 off solution outlined above does not work, however, it also shows that
 other types of solution are possible. And the two types of solution
 yield a general lesson we can take from the preceding: to preserve
 testability when a theory under test is probabilistically relevant to the
 test process when the two are considered in isolation, find a way to
 eliminate that probabilistic relevance. Screening off is one way of doing
 this. Setting up the experiment in such a way that the measurement is
 at the wrong level of generality or precision for the theory to make a
 difference to the probability that the measurement is reliable is another.
 CONCLUSION
 In this paper I have assumed a picture of confirmation as the raising
 of probabilities, thus giving a central place to probabilistic relevance
 in the conception of evidence and giving the greatest possible chances
 to the idea that the probabilistic relevance of a theory to everything
 will interfere with independence of evidence for auxiliaries used to
 test it. Even so, careful scrutiny of the intuitive and probabilistic notions
 surrounding independent evidence has shown that fears that unifica-
 tion of science will interfere with testability of ever more unified theories
 are largely unfounded: background knowledge often screens off the
 relevance of the theory under test to the test procedures. To the
 credit of the disunitarian's argument, I see no way of giving a general
 guarantee that independent evidence can be found in every case of
 testing a maximally unified theory, and that argument correctly identi-
 fies an important reason why. However, that challenge does not imply
 that we must fail, and the kind of ad hoc ingenuity that is required
 to overcome such a problem when background knowledge is not
 sufficient is not unlike what a scientist must bring to the other kinds
 of challenges involved in designing a telling experiment. Moreover,
 there is general advice that we can give: find a way to eliminate the
 probabilistic relevance of the theory under test to the specific thing
 you need to rely on in assessing the experimental result.
 SHERRILYN ROUSH
 Rice University
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